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Introduction 
In his philosophical writings, Alain Badiou takes on a difficult task.  He seeks to 
simultaneously open and close the political sphere through a rethinking of politics that unlocks 
the political potential of real situations, radical events, and substantive change while closing the 
political sphere to opinion, dogma, institutionalized knowledges and hegemonic ideologies. The 
European Graduate School’s website contains a more succinct and all-encompassing statement 
of Badiou’s philosophical project. “Badiou’s most general goal can be described…as the effort to 
expose and make sense of the potential for profound, transformative innovation in any 
situation.”
1
  Keeping these short statements of Badiou’s philosophical fixation on the innovative 
potential of the situation as the endgame of his project in mind, I will use the space of this thesis 
to tease out the implication of Badiou’s radical thought on politics, political theory, and the 
political as such.  I will do so through a systematic explanation and critique of Badiou’s 
philosophy, focusing primarily on the political aspects of both his philosophical and polemical 
texts.  Through this analysis of Badiou’s primary texts and a limited review of some commentary 
on Badiou’s political philosophy, I will attempt to establish the importance and novelty of 
Badiou’s conceptualization of politics and the political, its implications for the broader study of 
political theory and its possible utility to the theorization of politics. 
 A few preliminary remarks on the scope and limitations of this project are in order.  As 
Bruno Bosteels
2
 has pointed out, Badiou’s work has only recently begun to receive significant 
                                                 
1
 European Graduate School, “Alain Badiou: Biography,” European Graduate School, 
http://www.egs.edu/faculty/badiou.html (accessed February 04, 2009). 
2
 Dr. Bosteels is a professor of Romance Languages and Spanish Literature at Cornell University. Without meaning 
to offend academics in that field, I find it remarkable in itself that one of the few articles from the American 
2 
 
 
attention—critical and otherwise.
3
  A significant proportion of the explanatory work that deals 
with Badiou in a rigorous way is written, not in French, but in Spanish, and is primarily 
concerned with particular political situations such as the Zapatistas or Mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo.
4
  Indeed, as of 2004, large collections of Badiou’s work still remained unedited and 
unpublished in their original French.
5
  What is most interesting and significant in what Bosteels 
says is not where Badiou’s work has not been considered, but rather where it has been 
considered, translated, read and utilized.  In the tumultuous Latin American political climate 
peppered with resistance to authoritarian regimes and popular uprisings, Badiou’s work has been 
used as an inspiration towards political practice.  The importance of this fact, especially for a 
philosopher whose work is as intellectually demanding as Badiou’s, is that his message of the 
politicization of philosophy is beginning to come to fruition in a way that makes a close reading 
of his work necessary both for the understanding of his impact on political philosophy, but also 
for a better understanding of how his work has and will continue to influence the political 
landscape which we inhabit.  
 To accomplish a better understanding of his work, I will focus chiefly on the primary 
texts of the author in question.  Because of the fact that there is a dearth of secondary material 
and commentary written explicitly to legitimize certain interpretations of Badiou, or to point out 
conflicting interpretations and their relative merit, I am unable to draw on a vast knowledge and 
interpretation of Badiou’s thought from the academic community.  Being able to employ these 
resources might have led to a more sophisticated account of the way in which Badiou’s political 
                                                                                                                                                             
academy regarding the relationship of Badiou’s work to politics was written by a professor of Romance Languages 
and Spanish Literature. 
3
 Bruno Bosteels, “Post-Maoism: Badiou and Politics,” Positions 13, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 577. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
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thought fits within the broader category of his philosophy.  However, there being a relative lack 
of secondary material on Badiou allows for a focus on the primary texts and the unraveling of a 
complicated and intricate political philosophy from within the framework of a more multifarious 
collection of philosophical writings. 
 This point brings me to the scope of the paper.  Badiou’s work, particularly his seminal 
treatise Being and Event, is challenging and sometimes “studded with equations and theorems 
that may frighten off the scholar who fled to the humanities to escape mathematics.”
6
  It is not 
my purpose here to give a thorough explanation of Badiou’s method, his use of set theory and 
philosophy of mathematics, or his subtractive ontology.  While those concepts may occasionally 
be referred to out of necessity, I would recommend a close reading of Badiou’s texts as the best 
source for gaining a better and more exhaustive account of them.  My project here is simply to 
make an argument about the consequences of Badiou’s work for political theory. 
 What is this argument?  Principally, it is that Badiou’s work does have consequences for 
political theory and political practice.  Badiou’s political philosophy contains theories, opinions 
and reconceptualizations that touch on issues that are essential to politics: the concept of truth 
along with his idiosyncratic definition of truth; a concept of metapolitics; evental politics; 
fidelity to the event; and opprobrium for parliamentary democracy. Coupled with his 
commitment to radical equality, his fresh reworking of philosophy from the ground up makes 
him a figure both novel and significant in political thought.   
However, while Badiou does make important contributions to the understanding of 
various concepts in a unique way, it is not immediately apparent that his admittedly prestigious 
contribution to the study of ontology translates into a rigorous system for understanding politics, 
                                                 
6
 Charles Byrne, “Being M. Badiou: The French Philosopher Brings His Ideas to America, Creating a Buzz,” The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, Research and Books, March, 24, 2006. 
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the political subject, or the political event.  Indeed, the initial excitement of having completed the 
laborious task of sifting through Badiou’s carefully laid out arguments against many of the 
prevailing paradigms of what is good in politics eventually wears off.  Then, the choice of 
whether or not to assign the title of a generalized system of thinking about and doing politics to 
what Badiou presents is upon the reader.  This task proves to be difficult.   
Although he often writes in abstract terminology, the binding rigidity of the conditions 
under which an event or series of events is called “politics” in his philosophy proves to be an 
astringent to the very notion of the political event. Paradoxically, while the political event is 
constricted to the revolutionary context, political space is opened to the ubiquitous situation.  
Because of the philosophical precision with which Badiou approaches his work, and his Pauline 
commitment
7
 to the idea of the philosopher-revolutionary dedicated to the propagation of the 
truth to which he has committed himself, it is worth the exercise to engage in a dialogue with 
Badiouean ideas and concepts of the political. By striking at the very fundamental concepts on 
which the contemporary order is founded (things like parliamentary democracy and universal 
human rights), Badiou helps to elucidate the philosophical contradictions involved in the thought 
and action of political thinkers/actors which should lead to a thorough reexamination of the 
fundamental principles of today’s political system(s).
8
 
 To argue the point that Badiou’s work is noteworthy and consequential in the field of 
political theory, I will address three major concepts that are fundamental to his political-
philosophical project and how they are linked to the political as such.  First, I will explain the 
                                                 
7
 It is worth noting here that his reinterpretation of the Pauline texts of the Christian tradition place him within a 
subgenre of poststructuralist thinkers who link usually radical politics with religion e.g. Antonio Negri, Emmanuel 
Levinas, Jacques Derrida –and in the Anglo-American liberal academy, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer. 
8
 Although, It should be noted that Badiou’s political philosophy does not grow out of the contradictions of the 
present order, but rather out of a genuine commitment to the innovative potential of the situation. 
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concept of the subject in Badiou.  I will pay particular attention to the political subject—above 
the amorous, scientific and artistic, for obvious reasons—what designates the political subject as 
political, and the process of becoming a political subject.  This discussion will not only provide 
some elementary insight into Badiou’s ontology, but also a thorough explanation and critique of 
the concept of the subject as it relates to the broader category of being in Badiou.   
Second, I will deal with the concept of the event.  The event is of particular interest to 
me, because politics largely takes place under the auspices of the evental. Because of the 
centrality of this notion to the concept of politics, I have saved the most substantial critiques of 
Badiou’s political philosophy for this section.  Predominately, the critique that I will offer of 
Badiou’s conceptualization of the event will take aim at the destabilizing force of the event, 
which, by my own reading, precludes the existence of a durable political order.  I will also 
explore the extent to which Badiou’s explanation of the political event can offer a normative 
account of the political, as Badiou largely avoids discussing the normative in traditional terms. 
Third, I will deal with Badiou’s concept of ethics.  Choosing to deal with Badiou’s theory 
of ethics in a paper focused on his political thought may seem a strange choice.  Moreover, since 
the central concepts of truth and fidelity along with the questions of normativity and ethics arise 
in the context of my critique of the event and the subject, it may seem that this section is ill 
placed.   However,  saving the discussion of Badiou’s ethical theory—particularly his notion of 
an ethics of truths and the role that truth-processes play in the event and in the process of 
subjectivation—allows Badiouean texts to account for the criticisms leveled against them 
through a more penetrating explanation of truths and truth-processes.  Thus, the discussion of 
ethics allows another avenue into the exploration of the concepts fundamental to the political in 
Badiou. 
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Through the analysis of the subject, the event, and ethics in Badiou’s work, I will show 
that Badiou’s theory of politics strikes at the heart of conventional understandings of concepts 
that are fundamental to the study of politics.  His work touches the boundaries of such important 
concepts as truth, justice, equality, and freedom, which are essential to the theorization of 
politics.  Furthermore, he approaches these concepts with a novelty and rigor that makes him 
both and interesting and controversial figure in philosophy and political theory. 
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Chapter 1: The Political Subject 
I. Being in Badiou: A Political Theorist’s Guide to Ontology in Badiou 
A central concept in Alain Badiou’s philosophy is being. Indeed, it shares titular space 
with the event in Badiou’s seminal work Being and Event.  However, the most important places 
where being is discussed in Badiou’s work for my own purposes are not in the extensive 
meditations of Being and Event, but rather in the texts that discuss subjectivation, the induction 
of the political subject, politics and ethics.  While Being and Event is certainly important, it is 
only in these texts, such as Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, Ethics: An Essay on the 
Understanding of Evil, and Metapolitics, that the political subject and what it means to be 
political is allowed to escape from the circumscribed area of theory, and the reader is given a 
glance at what Badiou’s politics and political subject would look like if put into practice.  
 The arena of practice and practical utility of theory must be privileged over the 
theoretical maxims for a radical and revolutionary philosopher like Badiou.  It is all too easy to 
proclaim that the dictum of political philosophy must be to keep going, despite setbacks, failures, 
and lessons unlearned.  It is much too easy to call for radical change and an embrace of 
something different in an era marked by political malaise and calls of the end of history 
culminating in the global acceptance of the legitimacy of liberal humanism and democracy.  It is 
far too easy to stand at the pulpit of philosophy, preaching the ills of modern democracy without 
acknowledging its benefits, benefactors and beneficiaries.  And yet, it is the most difficult task of 
all.  To stand, like Saint Paul, against everything in the prevailing order and to bravely challenge 
the central tenets of modern democratic government and the State in its current incarnation—
certainly these things take more than a modicum of intellectual courage and conviction.  The 
question becomes, is it the conviction of a philosopher or a revolutionary, and is there any 
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difference?  For Badiou, these seemingly contradictory identities are bound together in the 
political subject, who has his roots in the complexities of being. 
 Towards an understanding of the question of being, it is first necessary to recognize that 
being is a complex concept. Acknowledging the intricacies of being, Badiou dutifully provides a 
detailed, extensive and sometimes labyrinthine mathematical and written account of the 
processes and discourses surrounding his account of ontology.  Indeed, a brief scan of Being and 
Event will likely leave one who is a political theorist by training scratching his head and 
wondering what possible purpose mathematical equations, axioms, and formal logic could have 
in a treatise fundamentally concerned with ontology; furthermore, what purpose could these 
mathematical descriptives serve in the study of politics, political theory and philosophy?  To 
answer these questions, we can look to a somewhat lengthy quotation from Jon Roffe’s review of 
the English edition of Being and Event in which he explains Badiou’s philosophical project vis-
à-vis mathematical discourse and ontology quite accurately: 
 “[T]he claim that is really at the root of the book is this: 
 The thesis that I support does not in any way declare that 
being is mathematical, which is to say composed of mathematical 
objectivities.  It is not a thesis about the world but about discourse.  It 
affirms that mathematics, throughout the entirety of its historical 
becoming, pronounces what is expressible of being qua being… 
Badiou…sees the task of philosophy as the commitment to elaborating an 
encyclopaedic[sic] vision of the existence of truths, and thus the maintenance of 
the category of Truth….”
9
 
 
What one can glean from this quotation is that Badiou’s central task in Being and Event is not to 
limit the scope of philosophical inquiry to mathematics (evidenced by the fact that he complements the 
                                                 
9
 Jon Roffe, “Alain Badiou’s Being And Event,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 
2, no.1-2 (2006): 330-331. All italics in original text. 
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mathematical sections of Being and Event with sections discussing poetry, literature and non-
mathematical philosophy), but, rather, to establish philosophy in its rightful place.  The coupling of the 
philosophy of mathematics and the philosophical treatment of literature and poetry in Being and Event is 
not only necessary for the aim of the work, but also symbolic of what Badiou sees as the necessary return 
of philosophy to the category of truth from a sole preoccupation with opinion and meaning.  The task of 
philosophy for Badiou is the defense of the category of Truth.  Let me be clear on this point.  For Badiou, 
the task of philosophy is truly the defense—not simply the maintenance—of the category of Truth, with 
all the accoutrements that come with the use of the metaphor.  Badiou sees the contemporary 
philosophical world and its laity as “doubly hostile to truth procedures.”
10
  Badiou’s philosophical war in 
defense of truth against those who would attempt to replace the concept in favor of meaning or the 
“‘culture-technology-management-sexuality’ system, which…constitutes the modern nominal occlusion 
of the ‘art-science-politics-love’ system, which identifies truth procedures typologically,”
11
 is, to follow 
Carl von Clausewitz’s legendary slogan, the continuation of his political commitment to the concept of 
truth by other means.  Reading Badiou this way, politics is of central importance to the considerable 
catalog of Badiou’s work. 
Understanding Badiou’s ontological project in this manner allows the political theorist to 
get right to the politics inherent in Badiou’s philosophical work without wasting much time 
learning the intricacies of set theory and theoretical mathematics.  By Roffe’s explanation, 
Badiou’s real purpose for philosophy is not the explanation of a philosophical approach to 
ontology, but rather to show that mathematics is, simply, ontology.
12
  Political theorists need not 
concern themselves with this ontology as mathematics, but should follow Badiou’s own opening 
remarks from Being and Event. “In a reversal of the Kantian question, it [is] no longer a matter 
                                                 
10
 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 12. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Roffe, 330-331. 
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of asking: ‘How is pure mathematics possible?’ and responding: thanks to the transcendental 
subject. Rather: pure mathematics being the science of being, how is a subject possible?”
13
  From 
the outset, Badiou tells us “what-is-not-being-qua-being is organized round two affiliated and 
essentially new concepts, those of truth and subject.”
14
  Following this, in Meditation 18, Badiou 
proclaims, “[t]he event belongs to that-which-is-not-being-qua-being.”
15
  Since “mathematics is 
the guardian of being qua being,”
16
 it is not unreasonable for the political theorist to approach the 
question of being in Badiou not from the ontological usage of being, that verb which designates 
existence, but rather from the standpoint of the singular being—the subject.  .   
II. Being a Subject: The Hunt for the Political Being in Badiou 
 The question of the subject is one that has been discussed and answered by philosophers 
and philosophical schools from the Ancient Greeks to the poststructuralists.  While there are 
many answers as to what counts as a subject, this central figure in the study of politics and its 
theorization remains aloof and nebulous.  For his part, Badiou begins his investigation with a 
clear definition of the contemporary subject on the initial pages of Being and Event. “The 
contemporary Subject is void, cleaved, a-substantial, and ir-reflexive.  Moreover, one can only 
suppose its existence in the context of particular processes whose conditions are rigorous.”
17
  
The particular areas where the strict conditions for truth-processes are met include only the 
following four fields: love, art, science and politics.
18
 The rigorous conditions of these four areas 
come not necessarily from the inherent difficulty of subjectivation, but rather from the favored 
                                                 
13
 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (New York: Continuum, 2005), 6. 
14
 Ibid., 15. 
15
 Ibid., 189. 
16
 Ibid., 15. 
17
 Ibid., 3. 
18
 Peter Hallward, translator’s introduction to Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil; or, Alain Badiou, 
Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward (New York: Verso, 2001), xi. 
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position of truth’s obfuscation within their realm. Badiou makes the claim that the homogenizing 
forces of global market capitalism have resulted in the nominal occlusion of the art-science-love-
politics system in favor of the culture-technology-management-sexuality system which, instead 
of privileging those categories which provide avenues for true breaks with what-there-is within a 
given area, represent a homogenization towards what-there-is and “designate a category of 
commercial presentation.”
19
 In line with the above-noted philosophical goal of making room for 
innovation in every situation, Badiou sets these four categories apart because they provide the 
space for truth-processes, and “only truths (thought) allow man to be distinguished from the 
human animal that underlies him.”
20
  Because these areas provide the space for truth-processes to 
take place, the properties of truth, which are fundamental to Badiou’s novel conception of the 
political subject, can take root.  The concept of truth, which constitutes the very essence of both 
the subject and the event in Badiou’s work, “neither claims authority from, nor (this is obviously 
the most delicate point) constitutes any identity.”
21
  Rather, truth, while remaining contextual to 
the situation, universalizes and “is offered to all, or addressed to everyone, without a condition of 
belonging being able to limit this offer, or this address.”
22
  Thus, the conditions set forth, which 
allow the truth-process to break radically with what-there-is, construct an un-territorialized space 
where the subject is marked not by difference or belonging solely to the particularity of the 
situation, but by sameness
23
 in fidelity to the universality of the truth in question. 
                                                 
19
 Badiou, Saint Paul, 12. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid., 14. 
22
 Ibid. Here, Badiou follows Louis Althusser’s concept of interpellation, with the important caveat of the 
universality of the interpellative call of the evental truth.   
23
 While normally used to denote the eradication of all differences, sameness in Badiou is actually more akin to the 
radical promulgation of difference in the real world.  For Badiou, reifying difference is the real problem.  The logic 
is as follows: if infinite alterity is simply what there is, individual differences are devoid of meaning—we are the 
same in difference. 
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Additionally, these four seemingly peculiar and arbitrary areas were chosen because 
“they mark out the possible instances of the subject as variously individual or collective.”
24
 This 
distinction between the individual and collective subject is critical to Badiou and I discuss it 
further below.  For now, it is sufficient to mark out the territory of each space.  Love, concerning 
two individuals guided by fidelity to the experiential truth of love circumscribes the subject(s) as 
individual(s).  For politics, in contrast, the subject is the collective of those with fidelity to the 
truth, addressing all in principle but never institutionalized within the State structure.  Art and 
science represent mixed situations with individual vehicles and collective importance.
25
 
Returning to the task of the search for the subject, it is necessary to further narrow the 
parameters to focus explicitly on the political.  I am not in search of a definition or example of 
the subject in general, but rather that particular delimitation of the subject that can properly be 
called political.  Luckily, Badiou schematizes the potential areas of subjectivation in a way that 
allows one to easily and immediately locate the area to which the political subject would belong.  
Because Badiou organizes subjectivation in this manner, prior to the discussion of subjectivation 
and the political subject more generally, it is useful for the political theorist to have at least one 
broad, explanatory statement regarding the category of politics in order to understand what 
subjectivation in the political realm is seeking to accomplish vis-à-vis the subject.   
In one of his more recent pieces published in New Left Review, Badiou posits a definition 
of politics as follows. Politics, for Badiou, can be understood as “collective action, organized by 
certain principles, that aims to unfold the consequences of a new possibility which is currently 
repressed by the dominant order.”
26
 This statement of politics has important implications for the 
                                                 
24
 Hallward, translator’s introduction to Ethics, xi. Italics in original. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Alain Badiou, “The Communist Hypothesis,” New Left Review 49 (Jan.-Feb. 2008), 31. 
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frame of possibility of the political subject in Badiou.  First, it should be understood that the 
instance of the political subject is one of a collective, as opposed to an individual subject. This 
statement follows from noting that the various arenas for subjectivation are marked by their 
possibility for instances of the subject as collective or individual, and that politics, as defined by 
Badiou, is collective action.  This claim is nothing short of the utmost importance. It marks out 
the space of politics as the space of collectivity not individuality. Coupled with the knowledge 
that the subject is induced by the universalizing force of the political event, which terminates the 
“predicative particularity” of the priorly territorialized subjects,
27
 the political sphere in Badiou 
becomes a space of sameness, not difference, with respect to the political subject.  Furthermore, 
the space of politics is the space of action, but, more significantly, the space of action seeking the 
actualization of a new possibility.  The political subject, then, must be a collective subject 
working towards the creation of something new against the repression of the dominant order.  
From the very outset, the rigorous conditions of the political in Badiou dictate that the political 
subject be a revolutionary! 
However, it is not just within the context of the political that offers a radical rethinking of 
the subject.  In Ethics, Badiou lays out the framework for the conceptualization of the human 
subject by proclaiming that “man is the being who is capable of recognizing himself as victim.”
28
  
For Badiou, it is the very status of victim that creates the subject of man as precisely an animal 
organism.  “[B]ecause of the status of victim, of suffering beast, of emaciated, dying 
body…[man is reduced] to the level of a living organism pure and simple.”
29
  Nevertheless, as 
Badiou points out, this fact is not the distinguishing characteristic of humankind—it is not what 
                                                 
27
 Badiou, Saint Paul, 57. 
28
 Badiou, Ethics¸10. 
29
 Ibid., 11. 
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separates humanity from the rest of the animal kingdom, but rather it is precisely what makes it 
the same as the rest of living organisms.
30
   
Yet, this declaration of consistency with other organisms is not the endpoint for man in 
Badiou. There is something more to the character of man that almost all philosophy since the 
ancients has sought to pinpoint and describe which makes this particular organism different from 
dogs, horses, rodents, insects and all other manner of living things.  Since the ancient 
philosophers, man has been described variously as the animal with rational capacities, or, as 
Aristotle famously remarked, “man is by nature a political animal.”
31
  Badiou, however, does not 
take this line of argument when distinguishing humanity from the rest of being; it is not some 
particular characteristic that proves to be the differential marker, but rather it is something 
intrinsic to humanity’s very mode of being.  For Badiou, the peculiar characteristic of man as a 
being lies in the potential for resistance “achieved precisely through enormous effort.”
32
  In the 
realm of Badiou’s philosophy, man is “precisely something other than a victim, other than a 
being-for-death, and thus: something other than a mortal being.”
33
 
This claim is certainly a radical one, and one that deserves some explanation and careful 
consideration.  Badiou claims that the worst situations that can be imposed upon human beings 
allow insight into the immortal character of human beings and that “in order to think any aspect 
of Man, we must begin from this principle.”
34
  This statement implies that immortality is so 
fundamental to the character of man that to think the subject of man one must begin with the 
statement of his immortality.  Still, it should be noted that Badiou states that only the “worst 
                                                 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a3 
32
 Badiou, Ethics, 11. 
33
 Ibid., 12. 
34
 Ibid. 
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situations that can be inflicted upon Man show him to be” immortal,
35
 and even then his true 
character is shown only through “enormous effort acknowledged by witnesses….as an almost 
incomprehensible resistance on the part of that, which, in them, does not coincide with the 
identity of victim.”
36
  How can this be, that the fundamental characteristic of Man’s being reveals 
itself only in conditions so extreme as to prevent anything other than docility and animal survival 
in humankind?  Why, then, is this considered to be the most important principle, prior to any 
attempt to think of Man as subject?  How can it be that the crucial focal point of Man as a subject 
can only manifest itself in conditions that simultaneously reveal the worst aspects of the human 
condition? 
Alain Badiou does not give an immediately accessible answer to these questions.  Thus, it 
is necessary to delve deeper into an exegesis of the texts.  To begin with, one can glean several 
things from the foundation of the subject in extraordinary circumstances and situations.  First, the 
true subject is something that is rare.  The particular processes where the rigorous conditions 
necessary for subjectivation can be found are obviously exceptional.  They are instances of the 
extreme, the radical and the revolutionary.  The subject, then, like the immortal gods of Mount 
Olympus, exists on the edge of the possible at the dividing line between the worlds of the mortal 
and the immortal.  It is only in this space where the subject can exist, on the cusp of what-there-
is and presented with the possibility of breaking through into what-there-is-not, blazing a trail of 
figurative immortality. 
Here, it must be recognized that the immortality of Badiou’s subject is figurative and not 
actual.  This point is of importance because it allows insight into the workings of the political in 
Badiou’s philosophical system.  The political is one of four areas in which subjectivation can 
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take place.  Politics, being one of those spaces, presents the human being with the opportunity to 
transcend the commonplace nature of his condition and gain a kind of secular immortality, or 
immanence. Naturally, as politics is the realm of the subject as the collective, the immortality 
that is gained by the individual is mediated by his or her entrance into the collective.  It is here 
where the individual becomes part of something larger and exceeds the limits of individual 
action and potential by becoming part of a cause greater than the individual subject.  
Immortality, then, is achieved in much same way that the revolutionary god Prometheus 
achieved it through the annals of mythological history in Hesiod’s Theogony—by the 
accomplishment of something rare and praiseworthy that changes the face of what-there-is. 
III. What Makes the Political Subject Political? 
 This is an important question without a clear and precise answer given directly by 
Badiou.  On the one hand, the political subject seems to be distinguished from the scientific, 
artistic and amorous subject quite simply.  The political subject is the subject for whom the 
evental subjectivation that takes place is in the context of a collective of everyone. Indeed, as 
Jason Barker points out in his introduction to Metapolitics, the political subjects are interested 
primarily with political prescriptions that offer no definite end to the revolt against contradiction 
and the dominant order.
37
  These prescriptions represent a kind of singularity not beholden to a 
broader system of thought, but rather to the particular context of the situation.  As Barker points 
out, for Badiou “politics has no substantiality or community beyond the real transformations it 
manages to bring about in any given situation.”
38
  Importantly, the word situation is left without 
definite content, a consequence of Badiou’s ontology of pure multiplicity.   
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In avoiding the mathematical underpinnings of Badiou’s philosophy, I have also avoided 
an explanation of the concept of pure multiplicity.  For the scope of this paper, it suffices to say 
of pure multiplicity that it is a concept born of set theory, in an attempt to salvage the concept of 
the subject.  For Badiou, the existence of infinite multiplicity as simply what-there-is becomes 
essential to his project of atheistic transcendence.  At the facile level, which is adequate for the 
purpose of understanding the conceptualization of politics and the political subject in Badiou, we 
can understand the argument as follows.  If finitude is what-there-is, death is the marking 
characteristic of being—being comes to an end.  What man is, under finitude, is a being-for-
death in a way that cannot separate him from any other living organism.  This proposition is 
unacceptable, because, as was highlighted above, man, in his most dire circumstances, proves 
himself instead to be altogether other from a being-for-death.  The second proposition that might 
be entertained is that there is an infinity that is singular in nature.  This singular infinite must 
represent something like God or truth, as opposed to truths in the multiple.  It is this kind of 
thinking which pushes towards the flawed teleological conception of politics, ultimately leading 
to a conservative and homogenizing principle of what is known outside of Badiouean philosophy 
as politics.  It is also what leads to the victimization of the Other, which constricts the Other’s 
ability to become a subject and fulfill his humanity.  In essence, the theory of the singular 
infinity is at root a theory of reified difference and not a theory of egalitarianism or equality. 
Opposed to these two hypotheses is the theory of infinite multiplicity, or infinite infinities. What 
Badiou points out at this critical juncture is that no matter which hypothesis is to be accepted, it 
must necessarily be an ontological choice.  It is an axiom that has at its root a historical 
decision.
39
  Thus, the choice of the infinite as the one infinite structures being in a way that 
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requires difference, that trends towards the conservative and homogeneous in politics, and that 
supports the victimization of the Other as different than the One.
40
 Therefore, in search of 
transformative and emancipatory being, event and subject, Badiou adopts the third maxim, which 
allows him the opportunity to resolve contradictions inherent to the prevailing system that 
privileges the One to the detriment of the Other. 
To return to the previous point (the lack of content in the word situation), a direct 
correlation to the above discussion of multiplicities is immediately apparent.  It is precisely due 
to Badiou’s commitment to infinite alterity and infinite multiplicities that the word situation is 
left ambiguous in Barker’s explanation of Badiou.  Indeed, as Barker later comments, the 
prescriptive statements made by political subjects are not “programmatic.  Their singularity 
represents no one in particular and engages whoever happens to be in the situation at any given 
time.”
41
  In fact, what binds the situation is not spatial or temporal constraints, but rather a 
principled truth concerned with fidelity.  As Barker highlights, politics does not engage within 
the bounds of spatial, temporal, or systematic constraints, but rather with “everyone in principle, 
not just those with the power and resources to implement a particular policy.”
42
  Politics in this 
epoch, for Badiou, must necessarily evacuate the identitarian political situation of the women’s 
movement, of the proletariat, of the student movement, and others in favor of a politics of 
fundamental equality, which represents a radically revolutionary statement of inclusiveness in a 
way that “extends the [political] situation beyond the bounds of ordinary commonsense.”
43
  That 
is to say, contemporary political common sense is that the politics of difference seeks equality 
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and does so effectively.  In contrast, Badiou sees identitarian politics as having served a purpose 
at one time, but now it does nothing but provide avenues for the prevalence of difference and act 
as an impediment to the truly universal political subject of humankind. 
Indeed, it is precisely these identitarian politics that Badiou excoriates as incompatible 
with a universalizable singularity and subjectivity in Saint Paul: The Foundation of 
Universalism.  Here, it is worth quoting Badiou at length in order to understand exactly what he 
identifies as counter-revolutionary in a politics based on difference: 
“…[E]ach identification (the creation or cobbling together of identity) 
creates a figure that provides a material for its investment by the market.  There 
is nothing more captive, so far as commercial investment is concerned, nothing 
more amenable to the invention of new figures of monetary homogeneity, than a 
community and its territory of territories.  The semblance of a non-equivalence is 
required so that equivalence itself can constitute a process.  What inexhaustible 
potential for mercantile investments in this upsurge—taking the form of 
communities demanding recognition and so-called cultural singularities—of 
women, homosexuals, the disabled, Arabs!  And these infinite combinations of 
predicative traits, what a god-send!  Black homosexuals, disabled Serbs, Catholic 
pedophiles, moderate Muslims, married priests, ecologist yuppies, the submissive 
unemployed, prematurely aged youth!  Each time, a social image authorizes new 
products, special magazines, improved shopping malls, “free” radio stations, 
targeted advertising networks, and finally, heady “public debates” at peak 
viewing times. Deleuze put it perfectly: capitalist deterritorialization requires 
constant reterritorialization.  Capital demands a permanent creation of subjective 
and territorial identities in order for its principle of movement to homogenize its 
space of action: identities, moreover, that never demand anything but the right to 
be exposed in the same way as others to the uniform prerogatives of the market.  
The capitalist logic of general equivalent and the identitarian and cultural logic of 
communities or minorities from an articulated whole. 
This articulation plays a constraining role relative to every truth 
procedure. It is organically without truth.”
44 
 
 It is now clear what exactly Badiou takes issue with in identitarian politics.  The social 
prescription of non-equivalent identity prevents radical change by allowing a systematic co-
optation of subgroups of people relative to their identity and the development of a discourse for 
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them within the system that they, prior to their co-optation, blamed for their very oppression.  
Importantly, it is not a particular group that Badiou caustically rebukes for this; it is the entire 
idea of identity-based political and social subgroups.  This point illuminates a consequential facet 
of the position that Badiou takes regarding politics and the political subject.  The political subject 
must, by definition, be non-exclusionary.  The subject is the subject of a universal principle.  
Like the Pauline assertion of Christianity as “Christ and Him crucified” at I Corinthians 2:2, the 
political subject must proclaim a militant truth that is at once opposed to the prevailing dominant 
order and universalizable to all of mankind. 
 This statement of the universalizability of the subjective situation and the driving 
principle of the event leads one in the direction of the political subject and towards what truly 
makes him political.  The political subject is political by virtue of the universalizability of his 
political prescription and of the universalizability of the situation, in principle, to the whole of 
humankind.  In this sense, the collective subject is the whole of humankind, in principle, who can 
ascribe to the evental prescription of the individual subject in question. 
 
IV. Critique of the Subject In Badiou 
 The subject is treated with a rare freshness in Badiou that can be attributed to the radical 
nature of his philosophical project.  Indeed, while continental philosophy was declaring that the 
subject is an archaic construct dating back to the Cartesian model, Badiou was already engaged 
in an attempt to salvage the idea of the subject from its naysayers.  However, the novelty of 
Badiou’s subject and his ability to establish it inside of a new schematization of subjectivation 
can be somewhat puzzling.  Nevertheless, one cannot allow the nostalgia for and identification 
with the colloquial and antiquated notion of the subject, with which Badiou’s subject shares 
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nomenclature, or the predetermined notion that the subject is a historical and social construct 
without relevance to contemporary philosophical discourse sway a genuine, reasoned and open-
minded critique of Badiou’s concept of the subject and of being.  With limited space and a 
focused goal, I will leave a critique of Badiou’s ontological project regarding set theory and 
philosophy of mathematics to others; instead, I will focus my critique on the issue of the subject 
and its political instance.   
Within the space of politics, Badiou presents a subject that is at once individual and 
collective—not just collective, but universalizable.  The political subject is nothing more than the 
whole of humankind, due to the necessarily universalizable characteristic of the political 
prescriptions made by the subject. This proposition must unavoidably limit the use of the term 
politics.  Politics, under Badiou’s system, would no longer properly refer to intranational politics, 
identitarian politics, rights groups focused on underprivileged minorities in only that situational 
context, and many other partitions of what is currently known as politics.  Indeed, Badiou not 
only wishes to see a radical emancipatory politics come into practice, he is actively engaged in 
bringing that about through his work.  As Barker points out, “[a]gainst political philosophy, 
metapolitics seeks to politicize, beyond the acceptable limits of political theory, philosophical 
practice.”
45
   
Certainly, those philosophers and political theorists committed to judging the political 
from the sidelines will cast a suspicious eye on this undertaking, and they have good reason to be 
skeptical.  One must wonder if it is Badiou’s commitment to fundamental truth that logically 
drives him to argue that the political sphere is constricted in the way that he claims and that the 
vast array of activities that we presently call politics are not actually politics at all.  An equally 
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compelling explanation would point out that it is Badiou’s commitment to a radical and 
emancipatory politics that leads him to schematize politics in a way that the only thing that could 
count as politics is a principled revolution against parliamentary politics and its contradictions, 
and that the only possible political subject could be the entirety of humanity in principle.  One 
must also wonder if these two motivational accounts are mutually exclusive. 
 I, for one, do not take issue with Badiou’s supposedly conflicted motivation, though I 
recognize that some, especially those remaining anti-communists among us who may recoil at 
the very mention of Badiou’s prior and perhaps continued commitment to the Maoist and 
communist project, may object to the ambiguity of Badiou’s motivation in schematizing politics 
as he does.   I do not think that Badiou’s categorization of the political subject as ultimately 
linked to infinite multiplicity means that Badiou’s fundamental commitment is to radical 
emancipatory politics and the revolutionary moment.  Contrarily, his choice of infinite 
multiplicity as the basis for political ontology betrays a fundamental commitment to equality 
born out of the liberal and democratic traditions.  This is to say, the choice of infinite multiplicity 
opens up the possibility for potential innovation in the situation by providing a path towards 
something altogether other from what-there-is.  The political situation is decentralized from the 
totalizing narrative of the singular infinite by the historical choice of infinite multiplicity, 
allowing equal access to political truth and a procedural sameness that deconstructs 
contemporary political boundaries. 
 Reading Badiou this way, his philosophical commitment becomes not a radical call for a 
neo-Maoist revolution, but rather a call for a radical democratic revolutionary moment that will 
unhinge the entrenched interests of nation states, political action committees and corporations 
who seek to reterritorialize difference in a way that is intrinsically anti-democratic.  In this way, 
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Badiou escapes the facile characterization and dismissal that a communist or leftist philosopher 
might receive, and instead receives the proper intellectual consideration that a philosopher of his 
caliber and obvious rigor indubitably deserves.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: The Political Event 
I. Introduction to the Event in Badiou 
 The centerpiece of my argument about politics in Badiou, and the implications of 
Badiou’s work on political theory and philosophy, is that of the event.  It would be difficult to 
overstate the importance and centrality of the event in regards to the implications of Badiou’s 
work on politics and political theory.  To be sure, it is the political event, inextricably tied to the 
political subject and truth, which provides the space and mechanism for the truth-processes 
necessary for radical change and the coming to be of what-there-is-not from what-there-is. 
24 
 
 
In this chapter, I will give a detailed account of exactly what Badiou means by the event.  I will 
also give an account of why the political event is a unique case of the more general concept of 
the event that provides for the implosion of the dichotomies of particularity/universality and the 
real/the transcendent in politics.  Once I have given adequate time to the explanation of the 
concept of the event, I will analyze the concept of the event, as defined by Badiou.  In this 
examination of the political event, I will underscore the destabilizing effects of the event while 
defending Badiou against those who would critique him as simply delivering an “axiomatics of 
resistance”
46
 instead of a generalized theory of politics and the political event. 
 Before any critique can be leveled against Badiou and his political event, the concept of 
the event must be attended to in the abstract.  That is to say, one must have a clear grasp of what 
the event is at its most abstract level before the evental subset of the political event can be 
discussed intelligently.  This task, unfortunately, is no easy one.  The most straightforward 
definition of the event given by Badiou comes near the beginning of the space assigned to it in 
his seminal work, Being and Event. “The event belongs to that which-is-not-being-qua-being.”
47
  
One must be ever vigilant to make sure that this statement is understood correctly, because it 
would have disastrous consequences if one were to misinterpret what Badiou has said here.  One 
is not to take this statement as saying that the event is that which-is-not-being-qua-being.  This 
interpretation is incorrect.  Following set theory, Badiou has posited that the concept of the event 
belongs to the set of those things that are not being-qua-being.  This proposition does not 
necessarily imply that the event and that which-is-not-being-qua-being are coextensive.  And yet, 
following the analogy of the discourse of ontology (mathematics, set theory in particular) it is 
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already obvious how Badiou works to implode the dichotomy of the particular/universal.  If one 
thinks about the set of that which-is-being-qua-being, we can think of that which-is-being-qua-
being as one infinite set.  Thus, being, totalized in the one infinite, proclaims that the event is 
not.
48
  The event, as a particular instantiation of the set of that which-is-not-being-qua-being, 
draws on aspects of both the particular and the universal simultaneously.  Each event is a 
particular “point of impossibility of the discourse on being-qua-being,”
49
 while allowing for the 
possibility of a new universal, a new infinite set of what-there-is. 
 At the most abstract level, which has been presented thus far, the event is an elusive 
concept.  To glean a definition of the event that is more elucidatory and practical from Badiou’s 
work, it is necessary to turn to other texts which offer a less technical definition of the concept.  
Looking first to Badiou’s Ethics, the concept of the event becomes ever clearer.  Badiou defines 
the event in Ethics as follows: “the event, […] brings to pass ‘something other’ than the situation, 
opinions, instituted knowledges; the event is a hazardous [hasardeux], unpredictable supplement, 
which vanishes as soon as it appears.”
50
  This definition provides more of a concrete explanation 
as to what the event is.  The content of the event is a happening that punctures what-there-is (the 
situation) and brings about something other than that—what-there-is-not.  This quotation also 
points already to the political nature of the event, which represents a real and particular rupture 
with the situation, considered as the state/State of what-there-is.  However, it must be noted that 
the event “vanishes as soon as it appears.”
51
  The event is placed on the cusp of change, and is 
not “what must arrive so there can be something else.”
52
  Instead, the event comes as a 
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happening, and as a “self-sufficient sequence of political-truth.”
53
  This truth-process, as a 
particular instantiation of a universal political truth, is elusive and often reduces truth to 
knowledge, allowing the event to vanish as soon as it appears. 
II. The Political Event As The Anti-State 
 Understanding the event in this manner allows for an almost immediate political 
consequence for the generalized account of the event.  It is clear, from the above definition, that 
the event positions itself in a context that is opposed to mere opinion, and, by extension, is in a 
position that aligns it with truth against both opinion and institutionalized knowledges.  One may 
object to this point immediately, and with fair reason.  To eliminate opinion and institutionalized 
knowledges in favor of the truth allows for the possibility of a majoritarian tyranny of truth(s) to 
rise to the surface in the face of democratic mores.  This point is especially valid within a 
philosophical system that adopts a notion of infinite multiplicity and multiple truths.  Badiou 
himself does not hide his disdain of contemporary parliamentary-democratic politics.  On the 
subject of the current incarnation of this political system, he says the following: “[i]t is clear, 
then, that what politics is the name of concerns, and only concerns, public opinion.  What is 
overtly eradicated here is the militant identification of politics (which, for me, is nevertheless the 
only identification which can ally politics and thought.”
54
  
The audacity of the claim presented here is double-pronged.  First, politics, in Badiou’s 
thought, is a process that is not only revolutionary but militantly so.  The mere persuasion of a 
group of people to think radically differently than they have previously is not a political event; 
indeed, this transformation is antithetical to the political event as it represents an 
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institutionalization of a different knowledge still contained within the prevailing system.  In 
many ways, one can be sympathetic to this viewpoint.  Merely thinking about the gains made in 
civil rights, women’s rights, and homosexual rights in American history can lead one to a similar 
stance.  It is easy to point to the struggles for gains and to denote points of departure, points of 
progress, along with happenings that represented successes and failures, but the event is elusive.  
There has not been an event signaling the abrupt end of racial, gender, or sexual-preference 
based classifications.  Certainly, we have observed militant moments what a non-Badiouean 
might very well call a political process, but the process is not fulfilled in the egalitarian flattening 
of the subject that is the marker of the Badiouean political event.   
The second prong of Badiou’s claim is that not only does Badiou conceive of politics as a 
militant exercise, he claims that bellicose political action is the only way that politics and thought 
can be allied.  This statement is both bold and confusing.  At the most fundamental level, one 
must question how thought and politics are aligned in militant action.  As Badiou points out 
consistently throughout his work, the distinguishing characteristic of the militant political actor is 
fidelity to the new and radical truth of the event.  And yet, to allow the event to work towards 
puncturing the power of institutionalized knowledges and opinions, constant critical thought and 
openness to change is necessary.  If the event is to be accurately described as a self-sufficient 
process of political truth while maintaining separation from the constrictions of the State 
apparatus, the truth of the event must remain unfixed and non-institutional allowing the event to 
continue to occupy the space of what-is-not-being-qua-being. It is transparent, then, that the 
alignment of thought and politics necessary to the event in Badiou remains antithetical to 
ideologies of all sorts, which ultimately serve to stifle critical thought, instead relying on the 
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prism of orthodoxy to interpret with an eye towards meaning instead of assess with an eye 
towards truth. 
 Perhaps here, at this revelation, the elusive event has been uncovered.  Thinking back to 
the earlier example of the struggle for equal rights across the spectrum of the American 
experience, an argument can be made that the event of civil rights has taken place. Because 
Badiou’s work seeks to politicize philosophy, and unite politics with thought,
55
 perhaps one can 
pinpoint the political event of such processes as civil rights as the moment where the truth comes 
to a group or individual as something new that punches a hole in the prevailing institutional 
knowledge.  It is here that the radical, militant moment reveals itself in the revelation that all 
men and women are fundamentally equal despite the prevailing knowledge that differences of 
color or gender require fundamental differences.  The consistent struggle, despite seemingly 
insurmountable odds and institutionalized barriers, provides for particular instantiations of the 
political truth of fundamental equality in the real situation of the day while still drawing on the 
more universal claim of the event of equality realized through critical thought. 
 Returning to the place of ideology in Badiou’s political event, the patent inconsistency of 
ideology and the political event is best laid out in his Manifesto for Philosophy.  In this text, the 
incompatibility of the event and ideological rigidity is demonstrated through a focus on a few 
key political events that Badiou views as central to the current epoch. “In order of the political, 
the event is concentrated in the historic sequence which stretches from about 1965 to 1980, and 
which has seen the succession of what Sylvain Lazarus calls ‘obscure events,’ that is: obscure 
from the point of view of politics.”
56
  .  The events which are properly named by Badiou include 
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“May [19]68 and its aftermath, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Iranian Revolution,
57
 the 
working class and national movement in Poland (‘Solidarity’).
58
  One must wonder why these 
events, above all others, are exalted as the political events of this epoch.  The significant aspect 
of each of these events, certainly, is a militant challenge to the prevailing order not beholden to a 
homogenizing or politically stabilizing principal, except, it could be argued, for those ideologies 
that proved to be at least somewhat central to the cause.  Indeed, Badiou sees the problems and 
injustices associated with these political events as inextricably related to the evental actors’ 
professed connection to Marxist-Leninism and “often archaistic Islamic preaching, whereas the 
core of popular conviction and its symbolization exceeded this preaching from all quarters.”
59
  
Instead of focusing on the ideological underpinnings of these events, as they are considered 
insofar as they are instances of the political event, they should be characterized by the spirit of 
the resistance and the rupture that occurs with the prevailing political order.  Indeed, earlier 
Badiou remarks that to understand these events, one should not seek first to judge “whether these 
events, in terms of pure facts, were favorable or ill-fated, victorious or vanquished.”
60
  For 
Badiou, the ideological discourses surrounding these events are of little importance. What is of 
more consequence for Badiou is not the representation, the purported cause, but, rather, the 
obvious intervention that takes place.  These noteworthy events represent the possibility of 
transparent representation of the event (in the form of ideological adherence to Marxist-Leninism 
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or fundamentalist Islam), coupled with an opaque intervention,
61
  ultimately doing a disservice to 
the spirit of the evental intercession. 
Now that there are some practical examples of the political event and its interpretation  
outlined, the exact definition and conditions for the political event can be thoroughly understood.  
Badiou lays out this definition in the final chapter of Metapolitics, “Politics as Truth Procedure.”  
For Badiou, an event counts as a political event only under certain conditions.  These conditions 
are as follows: 
“1. An event is political if its material is collective, or if the event can 
only be attributed to a collective multiplicity… ‘collective’ mean[ing] 
immediately universalizing.”
62
 
 
“2.The effect of the collective character of the political event is that 
politics presents as such the infinite character of situations…politics 
summons this infinity immediately, as subjective universality.”
63
 
 
“3[…]whenever there is a genuinely political event, the State reveals 
itself.  It reveals its excess of power, its repressive dimension.  But it also 
reveals a measure for this usually invisible excess.  For it is essential to 
the normal functioning of the State that its power remains measureless, 
errant, unassignable.  The political event puts an end to all this by 
assigning a visible measure to the excessive power of the State.”
64
 
 
From Condition One, Condition Two is immediately apparent as a corollary.  For the 
collective material to be universal means that it touches upon the political situation on a human 
level.  That is to say, the political event strikes at the heart of a political situation that is common 
and collective to all of mankind.  Thus, if the political event happening in Iran is has sufficient 
eventfulness,
65
 it should be a political event that is potentially universalizable and actually 
universalized to the whole of humanity.  Yet, this universality is not to the exclusion of the 
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particularity of the real situation in the context of Iran.  The universal aspect of the political truth 
is only accessible through the particular reality of the situational context, remaining consistent 
with Badiou’s philosophical goal of allowing for radical change in every situation and the 
politicization of philosophy that attempts to unify political thought and political practice.  
Condition Three is a bit more disconnected from the first two, but underpinning it is the 
distinguishing real world characteristic of the political event that was emphasized above—
intervention.  If there is a revolutionary intervention into the state of political affairs within a 
given political situation,
66
 the State will attempt to suppress that break with its legal authority.  
Importantly, and as Badiou points out, the State’s authority is generally immeasurable.  That is to 
say, the power of the State knows no practical limitations because it is rarely tested.  It is not 
measured, because to measure the power of the State, the power must be tested.  This act is 
precisely what is involved in the militant intervention of the political event, which brings about 
something other than the State. 
The hostility inherent in the relationship between the event and the State becomes 
perspicuous when looking at Badiou’s analysis of the development of communism.  First, it is 
evident that Badiou would not view as legitimate the argument that communism has shown its 
face, and it has manifested itself as an authoritarian regime.  Although, contrary to the standard 
argument that these materializations of communist thought in the form of the communist State 
were imperfect representations of communist ideas, Badiou signals a subtly different argument in 
his essay “Philosophy and the ‘Death of Communism.’”  Here, he says that the problem is not 
that the political truth of communism was manifested incorrectly or untruly, but rather that the 
political subjectivity induced by the political event of the communist moment “has become 
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unable to support, by itself, in thought and in act, the singularity of its trajectory (and thus also 
its philosophical connection to emancipatory eternity.”
67
  Because of the inability of thought and 
action (political theory and political practice) to be coordinated and sustained, the State becomes 
the representative of the event, as there is no other referent.
68
  Yet, the State does not represent 
the political event in its true form.  The State, as a political institution that is inherently 
exclusionary, cannot meet the requirements of either Condition One or Condition Two of 
Badiou’s political event. 
It is of no little importance that the political event in Badiou is centered around the 
rupture with what-there-is, considering that what-there-is at the time that Badiou is writing is 
precisely the State in the widespread incarnation of a parliamentary democracy.
69
  Certainly, 
criticism may be leveled against Badiou for his measured approval of the Iranian Revolution,
70
 
and the Chinese Cultural Revolution.  The methods of these political events were reprehensible 
and their ultimate results were repressive political regimes.  It may also be said that Badiou 
avoids the normative questions inherent in the judgment of these events, which is to his 
detriment.  In fact, Badiou does this purposefully, in order to deal with the structural problems 
and the issue of the intervention.  For those committed to parliamentary democracy, Badiou 
offers this upbraid, “[the vote] conceal[s] massive irrationality.  For why would number have any 
political virtue?...Such approximations are simply not tolerated in other domains where human 
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thought is at stake.”
71
  In fact, it is not Badiou’s political event that makes a mockery of political 
virtue and principle; rather, it is the homogenizing forces of contemporary political discourse that 
prize opinion above truth and the pursuit of it.  The rupture that Badiou proposes for the current 
generation is a rupture with the State structure as such, which prefers ideology, opinion and 
“knowledge” to truth. 
 Following this line of argument, Badiou’s meaning becomes plain when he claims that 
the event is a self-sufficient process of political truth.  Considering the annals of history, one is 
hard-pressed to give an example of real political change that has come as a result of the vote.  
Within just the American context, one can look at several significant political happenings 
including the founding of the United States, the Reconstruction Amendments, the Nineteenth 
Amendment, the end of Jim Crow segregation, and others and wonder whether the fundamental 
political truths that these represent would have been approved if a majority vote had been held.  
The answer is almost assuredly not.  Thus, the political event for Badiou, in a somewhat 
idealized manner, stands in stark contrast to the contemporary state structure of Western-
democracy,
72
 as an occurrence of a true political ethic. 
 
III. Critique of the Event in Badiou 
 To begin the critique of the concept of the event in Badiou, it is necessary to return once 
again to the political events that he lists as the concentration of politics in this epoch.  
Furthermore, it is necessary to quote Badiou’s manifesto for politics, found in his Manifesto for 
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Philosophy. “[T]he events in question are not yet named, or rather that the work or their naming 
(what I call the intervention on the event) is not yet complete, far from it.  Today, politics is, 
among other things, the capacity to faithfully stabilize this naming, and for the long haul.”
73
 
 Primarily, this quotation, with its preoccupation with finding some way to stabilize the 
political event, points directly to the destabilizing effect of the political event.  Because of the 
destabilizing tendencies of the political event, it is unclear what it would look like in political 
practice for there to be a Badiouean style evental politics.  The notion of the political event 
espoused by Badiou is so radical and antithetical to orthodoxy and political structures as they are 
currently known, it is difficult to imagine what a self-sufficient and perpetual  political state of 
resistance to institutionalization, co-optation, and orthodoxy would amount to.  Fundamentally, 
the political event is something that finds it meaning in being opposed to the current incarnation 
of the state/State.  It is easy to imagine what it would look like were there to be sudden political 
truth-process manifested as particularized instantiations in real political situations across the 
globe. In fact, this hypothetical circumstance would likely look something like the events of May 
1968 and its global counterparts.  It is more difficult to conceive of how these instantiations 
might perpetuate themselves once they have succeeded, deprived of anything to direct their 
resistance towards.  Perhaps the constant threat of institutionalization of a political truth as 
knowledge or ideology would suffice. 
 Badiou turns to the aforementioned events of May 1968, the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, and the Iranian Revolution as examples of the political event that require 
stabilization for the long haul.  On how these movements failed to stabilize themselves, Badiou 
is explicit—they ascribed power to outdated and archaic ideologies, which the popular uprisings 
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that were representative of the interventional feature of the political event far exceeded.  On how 
the political event can stabilize itself, the reader of Badiou is left to draw his own conclusions. 
From the depiction of the political events of this era that Badiou gives, it is obvious that, in these 
instances, the political subjectivity and universalism that is present in these occasions of 
resistance was subjugated to divisive rhetorical devices.  The transcendence beyond ideological 
rigidity is ultimately rooted in the fidelity to the event, which ideology suppresses by limiting the 
space for critical thought and institutionalizing political truth as political orthodoxy.  
Consequently, it seems, what is needed to stabilize the event is more fidelity to the spirit of the 
event, embodied in resistance. 
 This fidelity is ultimately rooted in an event without any obvious moral content.  There is 
little mention in Badiou’s work of traditional normative concepts. This absence serves two 
functions.  First, it allows the political event to evade inflexible and facile characterizations of 
the good often shaped more by regionally or nationally entrenched interests than honest dialogue 
about the good or true.  Second, it allows Badiou’s event to focus on meta-level problems of 
political structure involving concepts like the vote, mentioned in the previous section.  Indeed, 
when Badiou does take up the traditional political question of justice, he defines it as “the name 
by which a philosophy designates the possible truth of a political orientation.”
74
  This 
disinterested conceptualization of justice, instead of a distributive concept, is a state of being 
coincidental with politics as an “axiom of the collective.”
75
  Justice, then, is a concept that is 
prior to the political event.  That is to say, by the very conditions laid out for the political event, 
justice becomes the marker of the truth of a particular political orientation; a political event 
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based on political truth must necessarily be rooted in a concept of justice.  What ultimately 
caused the Chinese Cultural Revolution and Iranian Revolution to fail was the dissolution of the 
justice inherent in the political event brought about by a professed commitment to ideology 
above the political truth instantiated in the resistance.  
 Through this very move, Badiou also accomplishes the politicization of political 
philosophy by denying philosophy and philosophers the legislative role of naming the event as 
just or unjust.
76
  At first, it seems reasonable that political philosophers and theorists would want 
to make moral judgments about political events.  Perhaps there is something to be said for 
judging political events based on a principle or value independent of the political event.  It may 
keep philosophers from laudatory assessments of revolutions that ultimately have effects 
detrimental to certain principals of liberty, freedom and justice.  There is good reason to view 
Badiou’s philosophical move a propos justice as hazardous to traditional political thought.  
However, Badiou not only takes away the legislative perch of philosophy, but takes political 
philosophy a step further and creates a space for judging the political event that dismisses the 
politically independent concept of justice even more harshly than the label of injustice.  Because 
justice is an essential characteristic of the political truth-process, any political event that 
abandons justice for ideology is no longer a political event and no longer an evental space for 
subjectivation.  Not only does this mean that the event in question is apolitical in Badiou’s 
terminology, it is also restrictive of the human experience.  As the political event disposes of 
justice and equality, that which allows man to transcend the human animal that underlies him is 
expropriated.  This constriction is definitively worse than a simple injustice, showing that the 
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ostensible lack of normative clarity in Badiou’s political event provides for an even stronger 
normative content than the legislative philosophy that precedes it.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: The Political Ethic 
I. Ethics and the Ethic-Of Politics 
38 
 
 
 The previous section ended with a discussion of the normative content of Badiou’s 
politics and the political event.  There is no concept more fundamental to understanding the 
normative than ethics.  In this section, I will explain the concept of ethics as it applies to 
Badiou’s political philosophy, the event and his overall philosophical project.   I will also look 
more closely at the way that truth and fidelity are utilized throughout Badiou’s work.  Finally, I 
will offer a critique of the ethic(s) of politics in Badiou. 
Alain Badiou places politics in the category of those things that can be referred to as 
“fields of truth.”
77
 Together with love, science and art, politics provides a “possible instance[] of 
the subject.”
78
  To understand the way that Badiou thinks about politics, one must also 
understand one of the more general and fundamental problems that guides the search for truths in 
Badiou’s work—ethics. 
 The study of the ethical has long been connected to the study of the political.  Indeed, the 
essential question of ethics and politics could be said to be the same: “How should one live?”  
Plato laid the groundwork for this method of understanding political inquiry in his famous work 
of political philosophy, the Republic, by having Socrates address the problem of how best to 
organize a city as a quandary originating in the dilemma of how best to organize one’s soul.  
Because politics and ethics are arranged around some of the same fundamental principles (good, 
right, justice, etc.), it makes sense that Badiou’s major work on ethics would give the reader 
insight into how he thinks about the political. 
 If one were to think of ethics in the most general and common use of the term, one would 
likely be drawn to the questions of applied ethics, a particular subsection of ethics that has more 
to do with opinion than truth.  Applied ethics is that subfield of the broader discipline of ethics 
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that deals with prescriptive statements regarding what is good or right. However, as was 
mentioned above, Badiou goes to great lengths, with philosophical precision and rigor, to avoid 
the conditions of applied ethics.  
 Against any notion of applied ethics, Badiou claims that, “every effort to unite people 
around a positive idea of the Good, let alone to identify Man with projects of this kind, becomes 
in fact the real source of evil itself.”
79
 He takes this declaration as his starting point in defining 
his own ethics.  Analyzing this statement, one can instantly observe that Badiou makes a radical 
break with the way that previous philosophies and philosophers have thought about the good in 
relation to the political.  Badiou boldly claims, “Ethics does not exist. There is only the ethic-of 
(of politics, of love, of science, of art), “
80
 in an astounding repudiation of those philosophers 
who have tried to link principle-based prescriptive analysis to the analysis of the political. Yet, 
this examination of his repudiation goes a step too far.  While Badiou rejects a generalized ethics 
across four broad categories, he does not seem to renounce a generalized ethics within each of 
these categories.  This point is of central importance to the understanding of the political event 
and politics.  By avoiding a generalized ethics, Badiou places ethics in the realm of the particular 
and the realm of practice.  This move positions ethics in the realm of practice, and not of theory, 
furthering his goal of uniting thought and action in the political realm. 
 
 To understand what Badiou means by an ethic-of politics as opposed to a generalized 
ethics, it may be helpful to give a bit of history of ethics in the twentieth century. Beginning with 
G.E. Moore’s famous “open question argument,” ethicists began to explore a new direction, 
away from the regulatory questions of applied ethics and towards an “attempt to understand the 
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metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, [sic] presuppositions and 
commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice.”
81
  This novel objective, taken on by many 
prominent ethicists, led to the development of the field of metaethics.  Metaethicists began to 
discuss such questions as, “Are there moral truths?” “What are moral properties?” and “What is 
the function of ethics?”
82
  Noticeably, the questions asked by metaethicists generally do not have 
to do with substantive moral judgments at the level of the moral dilemma.  Rather, they question 
the nature of the process that moral agents implicitly accept by making moral judgments.   
 With this brief history of ethics in mind, one can more clearly understand the project that 
Badiou is embarking upon when linking politics to ethics while simultaneously denying a 
generalized ethics.  Fundamentally, Badiou, as a philosopher,
83
 is not as interested in the 
substantive material of an ethical truth as he is in the process and method gone through to arrive 
at the constitutive fabric of a truth.
84
  In the same way that metaethics goes beyond the elements 
of applied ethics to look for the fundamental presuppositions of all moral judgments, so does 
Badiou’s political philosophy go beyond the mere defense of a particular political system or 
political organization to the basic elements of the political experience.  As the parallel between 
Badiou’s work and that of the metaethicists becomes more translucent, one important caveat 
must be highlighted: just as the metaethicists’ original claim that their work did not have 
implications for applied ethics proved to be dubious, so would any analogous claim regarding 
Badiou’s philosophy.  The basic principles that he regards as the underpinning for ethics and 
politics are chosen by Badiou and should not simply be accepted without an argument in favor of 
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them. They do have implications that are far-reaching, as was seen in the above discussion of 
justice in relation to the political event. 
 It is now necessary to return to the principal that drives Badiou’s analysis of the ethics of 
politics—truth—in order to understand why his approach is both novel and important.  Badiou’s 
own definition of truth is, “the real process of a fidelity to an event: that which this fidelity 
produces in the situation… Essentially, a truth is the material course traced, within the situation, 
by the eventual supplementation.  It is thus an immanent break.”
85
  To unpack the meaning of 
this statement it is first necessary to further complicate it.  One should notice that in this 
definition Badiou refers to a truth as both “the real process of a fidelity to an event” and as “an 
immanent break.”  A truth’s relationship to time seems to be different in the first definition than 
in the second.  That is to say, a truth seems to happen over a course of time (as it is a process) 
while simultaneously happening in an instant (as an “immanent break”).  This realization allows 
one to understand the complexity of a truth within Badiou’s philosophy.  A truth is at once 
totally contextualized within the specific happening of an immanent break, but also objective, 
universal and long-term because of the procedural property that it must maintain.   
The process by which a truth becomes objective in the real world is what links it to both 
ethics and politics and, at the same time, what provides for the double understanding of a truth as 
both subjective and objective.  A truth, for Badiou, is the result of what fidelity produces in a 
situation, which is nothing more than the process of fidelity to an event.
86
  An event is something 
that happens which “cannot be reduced to [the] ordinary inscription in ‘what-there-is.’”
87
  The 
event, as a radical departure from what-there-is, compels the animalistic nature of human beings 
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to exceed itself and “decide a new way of being.”
88
  When thinking about politics or ethics in 
relation to Badiou, it is helpful to understand the event in this way—as the supplemental material 
needed to induce subjectivity from the animalistic being whose material course is traced within 
the framework of what-there-is.
89
 It is thus evident that truth can be considered both objective 
and subjective in Badiou’s theory.  This conclusion is the result of the way that the event can 
induce the subject through the “immanent break” while still maintaining the formal qualities of a 
process.  Because each truth is inextricably tied to the fidelity of a subject to a new way of being 
that allows him to trace his material being outside of what-there-is, a truth is necessarily a 
subjective phenomenon.  In addition, insofar as a truth maintains the formal properties of a 
process that is repeated, it is objective.  Therefore, one can accurately maintain that truth is both 
a subjective and objective phenomenon. 
This is the point at which the novelty and genius of Badiou is particularly evident.  The 
conceptualization of truth as a phenomenon, rooted in events, processes and subjectivities breaks 
from notions of truth that are passive in nature.  A truth, then, cannot be a simple statement like 
“2+2=4,” but rather must be related to the very essence of a subjectivity within a given situation.  
Here again, the link between the theoretical and the practical comes to the forefront.  A truth, as 
a militant process that breaks with what-there-is in the realm of the real situation, requires the 
work and practical struggle that reveals the true character of humanity in the immortal, 
transcendent and immanent break.  The understanding of truth as an active phenomenon is vital 
to comprehending the implications that Badiou’s work has for ethics and politics because in it 
lies the foundation for politics. 
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To understand truth as active, and to understand politics as a “field of truth,”
90
 one must 
understand politics as a realm of activity.  Yet, this is not all.  One cannot simply say that politics 
is a realm of activity because it is a field of truth.  There is something more profound in Badiou’s 
notion of truth that points towards a truly radical demarcation of the political.  Following 
Badiou’s definition that a truth is something that is an immanent break with what-there-is, a 
political truth or a political event must be some occurrence that achieves this break for a 
community.  True politics must break radically from what-there-is, induce the subjectivity of a 
community, demand fidelity to the event in the form of tracing the material course of the 
subjective community outside of what-there-is, and, through these feats, achieve a new way of 
being for the community wholly outside the previous situational status quo.   
To understand more fully how Badiou understands the relationship between truth and 
politics, and why the stringent conditions for the political are necessary, one should look to his 
Metapolitics and Ethics.  Reviewing the conditions for politics from above, Badiou outlines the 
political event as follows.  First,” [a]n event is political only if its material is collective, or if the 
event can only be attributed to a collective multiplicity.”
91
  Second, “[t]he effect of the collective 
character of the political event is that politics presents as such the infinite character of 
situations.”
92
  Finally, “Politics summons the power of the State.  Moreover, it is the only truth 
procedure to do so directly.”
93
 As was noted in the previous chapter, the summoning of the 
power of the State comes from the real world experience of fidelity to the event represented by 
the active ethic-of politics. To gain a more comprehensive grasp on the relationship between 
politics and truth as represented by the ethic-of politics, it is helpful to think of politics in the 
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shorthand that Badiou gives: “What singulari[z]es the political procedure is the fact that it 
proceeds from the infinite to the 1.  It makes the 1 of equality arise as the universal truth of the 
collective by carrying out a prescriptive operation upon the infinity of the State….”
94
  In other 
words, politics is characterized by the move from the infinite to the one as the one is able 
understand himself as an individual with the power to carry out change against the State.  
Moreover, this realization comes as the result of political action—an instantiation of truth in the 
political realm—that unites political thought and political action.   
What is peculiar to Badiou’s theory of politics is that the final form of political 
transcendence is not found in the one realizing he is a part of the whole, but rather that the whole 
recognizes that there are ones that are constitutive of it.  The infinite transcends to the one.   If 
one thinks back to the definition of truth offered by Badiou in his Ethics, the whole picture 
comes together quite well.  A truth must induce a subject and must represent an “immanent 
break” with what-there-is.  For the infinite to exceed itself into the realization of the one 
recognizes this immanent break; that is, the collective recognizes and embraces the immanence 
of the one.  The one, then, is the marker of the final product of politics.  But, it is the one of 
equality not the one of difference.  The one of equality must mean a double-being both as one 
and as a member of the collective—as an equal member of the collective being, maintaining 
individuality.   
Taking this point to a more abstract level, the notion of the particularity of the situation 
and how it relates to the universal political truth is also brought into a clearer light.  The singular 
political situation is of the utmost importance, because it represents the individual instantiation of 
the human political situation.  As a particular group, like the actors in the Iranian Revolution, rise 
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up in an immanent break with what-there-is with fidelity to the principle of justice, the infinite of 
the collective of humanity, which lives in a state of injustice, exceeds itself into the one of the 
particular event of the Iranian revolution. 
II. Critique of the Ethic-Of Politics 
Badiou’s theory of politics and truth is novel and inventive, no doubt.  But the question 
remains to be asked: does it accurately reflect the way things actually work, and is it helpful in 
analyzing politics and the political? 
First, the conceptualization of truth offered by Badiou should be taken up. This is the 
concept that underlies the entirety of Badiou’s work in ethics and politics and provides for the 
ontological turn of the infinite exceeding itself into the one.  The truth as an active concept is no 
doubt a brilliant one, yet it does seem to keep some things normally considered to be truths out 
of the realm of truth.  For example, how should we describe statements like “2+2=4” if not as a 
truth?  “2+2=4” does not represent an immanent break with what-there-is and force human 
beings to decide a new way of being, thus it does not meet Badiou’s requirements for a truth.  
Yet, one would normally say at least that “2+2=4” is true, if not that it was a fundamental 
mathematical truth. 
The most likely explanation that would allow Badiou’s notion of truth to remain intact in 
light of the above difficulty is that he has committed himself to a new meaning of the word 
“truth” and is willing to accept the consequences.  Indeed, in the opening pages of Saint Paul, 
Badiou remarks that Saint Paul would be the guide towards a foundation of universalism 
precisely because he sought to reconnect the truth to the subject and accepted the consequences 
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of such an act.
95
  Thus, it is likely that Badiou sees himself in this same mold.  In direct 
opposition to modern philosophers like Kant, who sought to establish transcendental categorical 
maxims that held universally in the same manner as mathematicians, Badiou, establishing his 
philosophy and politics through the philosophy of mathematics rejects the banality of 
mathematically derived truths in favor of an active concept that has ontological and political 
consequences. 
However, it should be noted that there are extreme effects of Badiou’s notion of active 
truth-processes on the way human beings can experience political life.  Adopting this idea of 
truth means that politics as stability is not politics.  This conclusion follows from the fact that a 
truth must be an immanent break from what-there-is resulting in a fidelity to the event.  That is to 
say, political truth must result in a radical alterity from the current political state.  What Badiou 
perceives as politics then, is nothing more than a state of eternal revolution; anything short of the 
perpetuation of radical revolution cannot be called politics if one is to remains faithful to 
Badiou’s definition of a politics of truth. 
While it is true that Badiou does spend time criticizing the current state of politics in such 
a way that some would likely agree with him, it is also true that a definition of politics that calls 
for infinite revolution without prescribing content to said revolution may be disastrous if acted 
upon.  As was discussed above, without a general ethics, but only an ethic-of, with the only 
content of this ethic-of being the fidelity to a truth in the event, there is no moral content to such 
a revolution.  In light of the current discussion of the concept of truth, this point deserves further 
examination.  It may appear that Badiou would be just as happy with a fascist revolution as he 
would be with a Marxist or democratic one. However, if one gives Badiou a charitable reading 
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and thinks subtly about what he is saying, this cannot be the case.  In fact, his philosophy  
actually privileges democracy above all else as the only true form of politics. 
If one looks carefully at Badiou’s characterization of politics, it requires a commitment to 
truth, but also to a political material is collective and related to the infinite.  This stipulation, 
while not providing content for revolutionary activity, does provide a normative restriction if 
followed to its logical conclusion.  That is, for the material of the event to be collective means 
that it has to do with equality and universalism as opposed to otherness and difference.  This 
constraint provides a revolutionary restriction that is normative in character.  For instance, if one 
were to think of a fascist revolution in terms of Badiou’s politics, it could not be considered to be 
political in light of the fact that politics is connected with fidelity to the evental truth and the 
collective subject.  A fascist regime is concerned with national pride and focused on the 
uniqueness of a particular collective vis-à-vis other collectivities, identities, cultures, 
nationalities or individuals.    Hence, a fascist revolution does not provide for the possibility of 
the infinite to move towards the one because its subject matter is never the infinite.  It begins 
with a fundamental flaw—it has demarcated its collectivity in such a way that it could never be 
accepted by the larger collectivity of humanity. 
Here, one can see the true character of Badiou’s politics.  The genuinely Badiouean 
politics must not only provide for the transcendence of the individual towards the collective, but 
this collective must be infinite.  Again, the double-placement of truth as contextual and universal 
is shown to be essential to politics.  A political truth must necessarily be collective because it is 
tied to activity and the event.  It must induce a subject, and this subject is a being in the real 
world doing real things and has a real fidelity to the truth within the framework of the event.  
Yet, to fulfill the stipulation that politics must allow for the infinite to move towards the one, for 
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the possibility of politics as a unification of the infinite in the individual, the truth disclosed and 
held to with fidelity must be universally acceptable.  Therefore, the fascist revolution could not 
participate in a politics of truth.  In fact, for Badiou, it seems likely that the only authentic 
politics of truth would be a democratic politics of equality.  A politics that embraces moral and 
ethical symmetry and equality among all people without dictating moral content is the only 
Badiouean politics.   
Yet, the question remains as to the stability of such a political system given the 
importance of truth and the event in Badiou’s philosophy.  To achieve such a democratic system 
would definitely require an immanent break with what-there-is, but once achieved, the function 
of politics and its revolutionary character would perhaps have to be tempered.  It seems that 
Badiou’s characterization of politics in such a system may need to be amended to include the 
ability to maintain a political system of equality and truth once it has been established.  Or, 
perhaps, Badiou is much more skeptical about the ability to achieve such a political system that 
maintains true to the principals that it set out to propagate than he leads the reader to believe.  
Alternatively, the raw potential of the event could be tapped into as a stabilizing factor.  The 
commitment and fidelity to the political truth of justice, equality and moral symmetry opens the 
door to infinite progression, as evental politics constantly improves upon itself and moves 
forward. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
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 Alain Badiou’s work provides a novel way to look at the theory of the political.  Through 
the eyes of a radical in an age of consent, Badiou’s philosophical and polemic writings are able 
to highlight the taboo subjects that much work today leaves untouched.  Indeed, Badiou’s 
devotion to the concept of truth strikes at the very heart of parliamentary democracy in its current 
incarnation.  It is parliamentary democracy, through an electoral system that creates the illusion 
of substantive choice in the general public but instead follows the heterogeneity principal that 
underlies the entire system, which begins with the ignoble lie.  It is the current political system 
that sees politicians falling to their knees before the poll numbers and worshipping at the oft ill-
informed opinions of the masses of the polity with no regard for truth.  Particularly in the context 
of American politics, truth has taken second seat to spin.  We need look no farther than news 
stations and newspapers proliferating opinion as fact to see that this is the case.  In this epoch, we 
have reached an especially appropriate time for a “really heterogeneous [manifestation of an 
other] idea of politics, for example, a politics of emancipation, a politics decided by ordinary 
people and not by the guardians of the state, a politics not concerned with elections.”
96
 
 This radical reconceptualization of politics is exactly what Badiou offers.  In Badiou, we 
can see a unified theory of politics, the political event, truth and the subject—all, by his 
estimation, rare occurrences.  On the one hand, we have the subject: Man.  As pointed out above, 
Badiou offers two initial understandings of the subject Man.  First, man is that animal which can 
conceive of himself as victim, as mortal, as being-for-death.  Despite the knowledge of 
impending death, Man does nothing to distinguish himself from other biological forms of life 
here.  He is mortal; he has an instinct towards survival and the completion of daily tasks and 
chores like any other beast.  Yet, for Badiou, Man’s true character is revealed in his 
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immortality—his subjectivity. It is through the mediation of the event that subjectivity can be 
induced.   It is within the context of the event, which punches holes in what-there-is to bring new 
truth to the situation, that we observe man as a subjectivity.  Only in the space of the event can 
man achieves his true character as immortal.  Likewise, it is in the context of a politics of truth 
that the subject is defined collectively, as the collective of mankind.
97
  The political event that 
necessitates a break with current paradigms of the political making way for new possibilities is 
where we can, according to Badiou, find man at his fullest, truest mode of being.  Here, he is 
something altogether other from the being-for-death described in Badiou’s Ethics.  He is a being-
for-life; not just his own but the life of all humanity. 
 Yet, the question must be posed here: What good is a theory of politics that rests on the 
idea of the event?  Does Badiou’s politics really boil down to an “axiomatic of resistance?”
98
  If 
so, what use can this be in thinking about politics in general?  Must politics always be in 
resistance to something?  Perhaps there cannot be an escape from a dominant order that 
institutionalizes itself in order to resist the hegemonic ideas of the day.  Certainly, history would 
point towards the veracity of this claim.  On a cursory glance, they are few and far between the 
truly radical political changes that have not come about from an organized and sustained struggle 
against what-there-is from within the framework of what-there-is.  And yet, the argument can be 
made that, while significant political progress is often made in the face of seemingly 
insurmountable obstacles in the form of the dominant order, relegating politics and the political 
to these rare events that are marked by truly radical change is overly restrictive.  After all, with 
this definition of politics, what is one to label the electoral process that results in the election of 
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world leaders?  One can incontrovertibly assert that this cannot be politics in Alain Badiou’s 
philosophy. 
 Under Badiou’s schematization of politics, much of the colloquial and even scientific 
usage of the term “politics” could no longer be considered politics.  This is no small matter, but it 
seems a position that is almost to be expected from a radical, a polemicist, and a philosopher of 
revolution.  However, expected or not, it is a complication that cannot simply be ignored if one is 
to take Badiou’s work seriously for its implications on politics and political theory.  Here, as was 
noted earlier, is the major distinction between Badiou and other political philosophers.  Badiou 
comes to us not as a philosopher of the political, but of politics.  The political, in Badiou’s 
universe, is quite simply the place where political events happen.  It is where subjects face the 
hegemonic influences of the dominant order so that they may make way for new truths.  In 
Badiou, the reader bears witness to the unification of thought and practice, of political theory and 
politics.  Like St. Paul, who is the central focus of Badiou’s text on universalism and truth, 
Badiou sees the link between the declarative act of a truth and fighting for its implementation 
through political policies. 
 This is where Badiou’s work can be of particular use for contemporary political theorists.  
Badiou sees, with a radical’s eye, a definite connection between thought, truth and struggle, 
something that is largely seen as unthinkable in the American academy.  In fact, the foreign 
nature of this idea even contributed to the highly publicized dispute between Cornel West and 
then Harvard President Lawrence Summers that led to Dr. West returning to Princeton, as 
reported by West in his 2004 publication Democracy Matters.  If one is to follow on Badiou and 
West’s recommendations, one would likely see a revival of interest in political theory as a 
subject not bound to the obfuscations and esoteric vocabulary of the academy, but rather as a 
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subject with implications for the way that the political world works.  Badiou’s work, then, comes 
to political theory with a mission of emancipation of philosophy from the cramped offices of the 
ivory towers of academia.  His message comes to political theory as an adaptation of the 
metaethical notion of internalism—political thoughts that come from political theorists should, in 
fact, supervene on the actions of those same political theorists and philosophers. 
 Of course, this assertion will likely leave many taken aback.  Nevertheless, this is 
precisely what Badiou’s work prescribes for the world.  It will then be asked of Badiou: “Are 
you a philosopher or a revolutionary? Choose one, for you cannot be both.  Not at the same time.  
You must choose.”  And yet, this dichotomy is precisely antithetical to Badiou’s materialism, as 
well as to his broader philosophical project.  It is the idea that the mind and body must maintain a 
connection ultimately leading to the suggestion that thought and action cannot be separated from 
one another that ultimately proves to be an underlying principle of Badiou’s politics and 
philosophical project.  If one cannot take the monist step with Badiou, following Spinoza, then 
one can follow him no farther and his philosophy must be rejected.  The dualist question 
becomes, in Badiou, nothing short of the inquiry into whether or not one can be both philosopher 
and revolutionary, intellectual and radical, political theorist and political activist.   
While, due to Badiou’s personal biography, this question is obviously of the utmost 
importance to him, it is not at all clear that this is a desirable unification for the population at 
large.  Conceivably, the union of philosophical clarity and political action could result in 
cataclysmic and truly horrendous consequences.  Imagine, for instance, a fascist revolutionary 
bent on world domination and genocide with the philosophical clarity to carry out his mission 
with the assurance that he was on the path of the truth and simply needed to persevere whatever 
obstacles were set in his path with fidelity to the cause.  Indeed, it is this same kind of vigor that 
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one can observe in terrorists as well as more benign or agreeable revolutionary and radical 
activists. 
 Of course in Badiou’s world, where the concept of truth is taken seriously and where the 
conditions for the production of such truths are extremely rigorous and well thought out, the 
notion of a political-philosophical revolutionary fascism is absurd.  Badiou devotes a chapter of 
his Ethics to the refutation of the idea that Nazism could be considered politics.  While it is 
certainly true that under the conditions that he sets forth for politics, Nazism or any fascist 
variant would not qualify as politics, it is nevertheless the case that empowering philosophers as 
revolutionaries might cause more trouble than it is worth.  The notion that people should be 
accountable for their ideas and that deeply held convictions should provide motive for action is 
certainly a valiant one. It is also one only able to hold the prescriptive power that Badiou places 
on it within the context a largely democratic system where people have liberal humanitarian 
values.  Thus, while on the one hand he rails against the idea of parliamentary liberal democracy, 
the prescriptive power of his philosophy must depend on institutionalized respect for human 
rights, or a fundamental belief in the transcendent rationality of the proposition of human rights, 
in order to avoid a complete bloodbath.   Ultimately, this may prove to date Badiou as a 
philosopher of these times—calling for a new revolutionary moment which looses humanity 
from the self-imposed fetters of their own contradictions and questions the commitment to 
purported values in face of subservience to the entrenched power interests of the West. 
 The idea that there must be an ironing-out of the inconsistencies of the contemporary 
regime of liberal humanists, mock multiculturalists, and leaders and citizens who maintain a 
stunning lack of principled commitment to their ostensible ideals is ultimately the driving force 
behind the narrowed scope of Badiou’s politics.  What he describes in tedious mathematical 
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detail and abstract terminology in hopes of uncovering a generalized notion of the event is in 
actuality nothing more than the specific article would suggest: the event.  In a rehashing and 
rethinking of the Marxian world-historical moment, Badiou offers a generalized account of the 
political with contingencies and conditions so stringent that the space of politics becomes little 
more than the space of revolution.  It is a Badiouean revolution, to be sure—a revolution of 
truths and fidelities to those truths.  And yet, while it is certainly a worldwide revolution that 
Badiou calls for, the stringent conditions upon which the notion of the political event depend and 
the centrality of particularity to his project avoids a Marxian teleology. It is by no means certain 
that this revolutionary moment will come, or that it will come from a certain place.  Indeed, the 
moment that Badiou hopes for relies on the actions of real people in real situations—it opens up 
the possibility of radical change in every situation, allowing access to the universal and the true 
experience of what it means to be a human. 
 In the end, Badiou’s political theory opens up the political as much as it constrains it.  
While the conditions for the political event are constrictive, the political situation is almost 
omnipresent. Badiou’s politics is a politics of action within situations, not of general rules, 
transcendental maxims, or principles that allow for sitting on the sidelines.  The reader of Badiou 
is left with the excitement that comes from hearing that the time is now, and that abstract 
principles of justice and equality and their exegesis cannot be left to their own devices and 
expected to change what-there-is in the world of politics.  Where Badiou stumbles is in his 
inability to offer a clear explanation of how a politics of events could be stabilized without 
becoming institutionalized and betraying political truth.  Ultimately, the possibilities that are 
opened up by Badiou’s conceptualization of politics as a radical unification of thought and 
practice with the promise of continual progress towards truth at the expense of political opinion 
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should prove an overpowering temptation for the political theorist and political philosopher 
concerned with the place of truth in contemporary politics and political discourse.   
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